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ABSTRACT 
 
 Prices of French Icon Wines and the Business Cycle: 
Empirical Evidence from Danish Wine Auctions 
 
Jan Bentzen, Søren Leth-Sørensen and Valdemar Smith 
 
During the last decades auctions of selected wines have regularly taken place 
in Denmark. Therefore, by now, a considerable amount of data exists for auction wine 
prices, i.e. both the assessed wine prices of the auctioneer and the eventual price at 
which the wines are sold. From these data the prices of the most famous French icon 
wines (Premier Cru Classé) are extracted and a coherent time series data set is 
constructed. As the auctions have taken place several times each year, the data are 
analysed at a quarterly frequency. Having obtained the time series data for the price 
development of icon wines, these are expected to be influenced by a lot of factors, of 
course, but the income development as reflected in the business cycle fluctuations is 
considered to be of utmost importance. The wine auction prices are obviously 
exogenous to the business cycle, and thus eventual questions of causality are easier 
tested than usually done with many economic variables. Hence, the empirical part of 
the paper analyses the co-movements in the wine prices and the business cycle, the 
latter represented by several indicators in order to address the question of whether the 
wine auctions are affected by the general economic development or not. The major 
conclusions seem to be that the auctioneers valuation of icon wines may follow the 
international prices of these goods - and the prices of substitutes as represented by 
the stock market index - but in contrast to this, in recent years the actual hammer 
prices are stagnating and deviating from the path of the wine price valuations.   
 
 
Keywords: Wine auction prices, French icon wines, business cycles. 
 





Department of Economics 
The Aarhus School of Business 
Prismet  
Silkeborgvej 2 










During the 1990s, the prices of Cru Classé wines from Bordeaux increased 
dramatically. Sustained economic growth in the OECD area and significant growth 
rates in East-Asia combined with a widening of the wine market were the most 
important factors behind the massive price jumps that took place. The growth in prices 
of Cru Classé wines took place irrespectable of the huge advances in quality and 
subsequent increases in supply and variety of premium wines coming from many 
overseas wine producing countries, i.e. California, Australia, Chile, South-Africa etc. in 
this period. Furthermore, wine producers in countries within EU, e.g. Italy and Spain, 
made a large effort in order to strengthen their position at the market by offering wines 
in nearly all price segments at reasonable prices. Moreover, a standard result from many 
wine magazines reporting from blind tastings including Cru Classé wines from 
Bordeaux and top wines from other wine producing areas is often that the Cru  Classé 
wines were valued lower than their market price, whereas the opposite often is seen 
with wines from California, Australia and Italy.   
 
Still, the prices on Cru Classé wines did seem to live their own lives at least until the 
Millennium, with primeur prices of each new vintage never starting below the prices of 
the previous year. For investors of earlier vintages of the top wines, the 1990s certainly 
was a profitable period. E.g. a Chateau Cheval Blanch 1990 that could be bought en 
primeur for less than $50 now sells for a little less than $500 at wine auctions. Indeed 
many buyers of let’s say the top 10 of the Cru Classé wines most likely looked and still 
look at these wines as investment objects, believing that the prices of good vintages will 
keep rising over time. Consequently, believing that Cru Classé wines can be considered 
as investment objects their prices are expected to be influenced by economic factors. 
Moreover, expensive wines like similar assets, e.g. paintings, jewels, real estate etc, 
.must be considered as luxury products and as a consequence the overall business 
conditions are expected to influence the price development relatively more than e.g. 
prices on lower quality wines. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the prices on Cru Classé wines in Denmark. Being 
part of the EC since 1972 Denmark had to lower its taxes on wine quite significantly, 
and as a consequence the nominal taxes on wine today correspond to the 1970 level. In 
the 1990s, there was a 18% decline in real prices on wine, which partly explains that the 
Danish market for wine has been growing with more than 5% p.a. in the same period. 
By now the annual wine consumption corresponds to approximately 40 litres per capita 
(+15).
1 With the growth in demand the market for fine and rare wines has developed 
too (in Denmark nearly all Cru Classé wines can be bought in liqour store, 
supermarkets etc.). More and more wines are put on auctions in Denmark, which was 
certainly not that common in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
 
This paper concentrates on auction prices of eleven top Bordeaux wines at the 
Copenhagen Wine Auctions (Bruun Rasmussen). Naturally, the wine prices at the 
Danish Wine Auctions follow the trends at the international wine markets, i.e. the 
prices in London, New York, Chicago etc. Yet, comparing hammer prices reveals that 
at least in the short and medium run there are significant price variations for identical 
wines sold at the same time. Thus, other factors in determining the wine prices seem to 
                                                 
1 See Bentzen & Smith (2001) for an overview of the Danish market for wine.  
be at work. Again, looking at Cru Classé wines from an asset’s point of view, the local 
business condition potentially is an important factor for prices as is the development in 
prices of other assets. Consequently, using auction data over the latest 15 years, this 
paper analyses the influence from changing business cycles on the short-run dynamics 
of Danish auction prices on Bordeaux Cru Classé wines.  
 
In the following section, the wine auctions in Copenhagen are described. Section three 
presents price indices of the auctioneers’ wine price evaluation and the subsequent 
hammer prices of the wines sold. Section four analyses the relationship between the 
auction wine prices and selected business cycle indicators, which is further investigated 
by causality tests in section five, Finally, section six concludes. 
 
 
2. The Copenhagen Wine Auctions 
 
Bruun Rasmussen – Auctioneers of Fine Art 
The information on estimated prices and hammer prices of wine at auctions in Denmark 
comes from wine auctions held at Bruun Rasmussen Auctioneers of Fine Art, 
Copenhagen. It is the largest and most important auction house in Denmark. It was 
founded in 1948 and today it has an annual turnover of more than US$ 30 million. It 
means that this auction house is the 8th largest in the world.  The turnover at the wine 
auctions is only of minor importance. Art auctions have the largest turnover, but the 
house also has auctions of books and jewellery. 
 
Wine auctions are also held by other firms in Denmark but Bruun Rasmussen is without 
doubt the most important auction house for wine. 
 
The wine auctions 
The first information of a wine auction is from 1973 and until 1982 auctions were held 
irregularly. From 1982, auctions have taken place at a more regular basis. During the 
last years, the number of auctions has increased to 5-6 auctions per year. At the same 
time a wider range of wines are put on auction. At first, it was almost only French wine 
from Bourgogne and Bordeaux, which was sold. Later on other French districts 
appeared and also wine from especially Italy is sold. 
 
Buyers/sellers 
The participants in the wine auctions at Bruun Rasmussen consist of different types. 
One group is the professional wine merchants who buy and sell. Also restaurants often 
belong to the professional buyers. If a restaurant has closed down, wine could also be 
sold at auctions. Furthermore, collectors, wine clubs and individuals with an interest in 
wine are buying. The majority of buyers and sellers are Danish but also persons from 
abroad, e.g. from the Nordic countries, take part in the auctions. 
 
Auction catalogues 
The data source of this analysis is the auction catalogues from Bruun Rasmussen. These 
catalogues include an estimated price from the auction house. At the beginning, 
information on hammer prices is only noted in the relevant catalogue. From 1992 the  
hammer price is also printed in the following catalogue. Today information on hammer 
prices is available on the Internet.   
 
Information on the wine 
In the catalogues the following information is given: 
•  name of the wine and year 
•  size of the bottle 
•  number of bottles 
•  if the wine is a Château vintage 
•  if the wine is in original wooden case. 
 
For the more expensive wines a measure of the level of wine in the bottle is given. The 
following specifications are used: 
A: Normal 
B: Very slightly under normal 




The estimated price is set by the auction house and rests on the experience of the house. 
The hammer price is the price for the wine at the auction. The seller might make a 
condition that a certain minimum price is reached. If the bids do not reach this price, the 
wine is not sold.  
 
The buyer should pay the hammer price plus 25% in buyer's premium including VAT. 
Before the auction, a preview takes place so possible buyers can inspect the wine. This 
means that the wine has to be present in the auction house. Transport to the auction 
house is an expense for the seller who might want to choose an auction house to which 
the transport expenses are limited.  
 
The buyer does not have to be present at the auction, but can leave a commission bid 
instead.  
 
Hammer prices  
As a first step in the empirical analysis, the hammer prices at the Bruun Rasmussen 
wine auctions (Copenhagen) are compared with prices at other auctions. Figure 1 
compares the Copenhagen wine prices with auction prices from The Chicago Wine 
Company. Both price series are measured in terms of the final buyer’s price with the 
25% buyer’s premium added to the Copenhagen hammer prices. The Chicago hammer 
prices are identical to the buyer’s price because only the vendors that consign their 
wines to the Chicago auction are charged a fee, namely 28%. 
 
  
Figure 1 shows that except for a short period - between the Fall of 1996 and the early 
1998
2 - the Copenhagen auction prices are systematically lower than the Chicago 
prices. The price differences probably reflect that the demand for fine and rare wines at 
the Danish market is relatively weak as compared to e.g. the market in the US and also 
in the UK.
3  The average difference in buyer’s prices is $100, but the standard deviation 
is as high as $88. Looking at the more ‘normal’ period 1998-2001, the average price 
difference is close to $130. The question then is whether a price gap of $130 is large 
enough to cover all costs in connection with arbitrage trade, i.e. bringing the bottles 
from Denmark to e.g. Chicago and London and offering them for sale there. Noting that 
the number of bottles supplied at the auctions normally is 12 or less and that the seller 
must include the 25-28% fee concerning the price difference if he decides to offer the 
wine at e.g. Christies in London or at the Chicago Wine Company, the margin is 
probably not large enough for arbitrage as seen from the sellers point of view.
4 On the 
other hand, the potential for making favourable bargains for foreign buyers seems to 
exist, because they can bid by telephone or other communication forms during the 
auctions in Copenhagen. Still, with permanent price difference existing between 
different geographical markets there seems to be barriers of trade, i.e. lack of/costs of 
information, transportation costs, costs for storage of the wines, etc. 
 
Figure 1. Buyer’s price for Chateau Mouton Rothschild at the Bruun Rasmussen 
Auctions in Copenhagen and at  the Chicago Wine Company; Vintage 1982, 














Sources: Chicago Wine Company and data (auction catalogues) from Bruun Rasmussen, Copenhagen. 
Prices measured as hammer price plus buyer's premium (auction fee). For some of the quarters in 1996 
and 1997, data are missing for the Copenhagen auction which appears as the dotted part of the solid line. 
                                                 
2 The Danish economy experienced a period of solid growth from 1994 and onwards, which was 
accompanied by notable decreases in the rate of interest and significant increases on real estate prices. 
Most likely these factors explain the Danish ‘bubble’ in the figure.  
3 See Ashenfelter (1989) who compares auction prices in London, Chicago, Geneva and Amsterdam. 
4 Part of the price differences is due to imperfect information as many suppliers actually do not have 
information about auctions outside Denmark, how to arrange for transport of the wines etc.   
 
 
3. Auction price indices of French icon wines 
 
The price information data from the Copenhagen wine auctions goes back to the 1970s 
but only from 1988 at least two wine auctions take place every year allowing for the 
construction of reliable price series. Hence, using auction data from the first part of 
1988 the construction of quarterly wine price indices is performed. From obvious 
reasons not all wines - and vintages - are traded at each auction which requires the 
following data calculation procedure to be persued. For each of the 11 Premier Cru 
Bordeaux wines and for each of the respective vintages ranging from 1950 to 1998, the 
increase in both price estimates and hammer prices are calculated from one auction to 
the next. The total number of auctions in this period covering 1988 to the last auction in 
June 2002 is 49 and among these only one of the auctions had to be deleted from the 
analysis due to missing observations. That leaves 48 consecutive auctions to be 
included in the data set. As a specific vintage from one of the chateaux may be traded 
more than once at an auction, the potential number of observations is huge - but 
usually, only a small number of vintages of each of the selected 11 wines appear at an 
auction. 
 
An additional aspect is the fact that the bottles may be different with respect to defect 
labels, the level of wine in the bottle, etc. When extracting data from the auction 
material, observations representing defects (e.g. labels) or wines are bundled (e.g. with 
other wines). These data are in all cases deleted from the final data. Concerning the so-
called A, B, C etc. conditions of the bottles – see above - no corrections have been 
made when calculating the price indices. The latter aspect is relatively vintage-specific, 
meaning that the later vintages usually are of condition A (perfect condition) and the 
older vintages sometimes condition B or C, and as the price indices will be calculated 
from vintage-specific growth rates, this problem may be of minor importance. The 

















From all available data representing the price increases between two auctions - covering 
all vintages and the eleven wines - an overall estimate of the average rate of increase is 
calculated. This procedure allows for the use of all available information in the total  
data set and also, when data for one of the wines are missing for a specific auction most 
likely data is available for some of the other wines in order to construct a coherent time 
series of wine auction prices. These data representing growth rates of prices are 
obtained for both the auctioneers’ own valuation of the wines to appear at the upcoming 
auction and the subsequent prices at which they are sold ('hammer prices'). Price indices 
are calculated from the basis1988Q1=100 and thereafter adding the index level values 
according to the respective growth rates. The results are graphically exhibited (Figures 
1, 2 and 3), and the price indices are in nominal terms as the application of a deflation 
procedure with e.g. the CPI may not be adequate in all cases in the later analysis where 
business cycle indicators appear.   
 
The price evaluation made by the auctioneer - and appearing in the pre-auction 
information material - is termed 'price estimate' in the following text and the prices at 
which the wines are actually sold appear as 'hammer price'. Both prices are net of a 20% 
auction fee but as only price indices enter in the analysis, this is of no importance. 
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit the price valuations and the hammer prices, respectively, as 
indices and presented as quarterly data. As some of the quarters in the total sample 
period are missing observations, the data series is completed by applying the 
exponential smoothing technique. The dotted parts of the price lines are the smoothing 
calculates and this is done backwards as the later years represent the most complete 
data set. 
  
In addition, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter has been applied to the data in order to 
investigate for trend and cyclical components of the wine price series. Looking at the 
data, there are obviously cyclical variations in the auction prices besides the trend 
development. Normally the HP-filter has been used in connection with analysing 
business cycle topics and is calculated for a time period (1...T) as: 
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1                                                     (1) 
 
The time series is decomposed into a trend component µt and a stationary component 
Xt-µt, where µt is selected in such a way that the expression in (1) is minimized. The 
constant   (set equal to 1600 in the following calculations) is somewhat arbitrary and 
reflects the cost of including fluctuations in the trend component. The extremes of this 
HP-trend are the original series (lambda = zero) and a linear trend ( lambda = infinite). 
The major advantage of the HP-trend in connection with especially time series data for 
fine wine is that no particular functional form is assumed apriori. Accordingly, the HP-
trend seems appropriate to detrend the wine data with a moderate price development in 
the late 1980s / early 1990s followed by huge price increases until millennium, 
whereafter the prices stagnate.  
  
Figure 2. An index of the estimated wine prices by the auctioneer, quarterly data 
1988:1-2002:2 (Index, 1988:1=100). 
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Note: The dotted part of the price index estimated by exponential smoothing using the RATS statistical 
software, where the optimal smoothing parameters are selected using the SBC and AIC information 
criteria. Also, the Hodrick-Prescott trend line is included in the graph. 
  
From Figure 2 the well-known high increases in the Bordeaux wines during the last 
decade are revealed as the index is constructed from the average growth rates of the 
prices set by the auctioneer. Especially from 1996 to 1998 the prices seem to explode 
which is in reasonable accordance with international tendencies of the Bordeaux 
Premier Cru Wines. During this period the primeur prices of Cru Classé Wines kept 
rising from year to year irrespective of quality, e.g. the primeur price of the 1997 
vintage was approximately 20% above the primeur price of the 1996 vintage despite of 
the fact that 1996 was a significantly better vintage in Medoc as well as in 
Pomerol/St.Emilion. Consequently, higher primeur prices are expected to affect the 
estimated auction prices on similar wines from ealier vintages in the same direction. 
 
The dotted part of the price line is the result of the smoothing procedure and this seems 
to perform well in the present case. The HP-trend can be interpreted as the longer-term 
development of the time series and shows an ongoing increase in the wine price index, 
although the prices have stabilized during the last two years. The latter tendency of a 
stagnating price development path since the spring 2000 may seem reasonable from an 
economic point of view as the former tremendous price increases must be slowed-down 
or reversed at some time. Furthermore, increases in primeur prices on Cru Classé Wines 
have been significantly more moderate/stagnating the latest couple of years. 
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Note: See note to Figure 2. 
  
The actual prices obtained at the Copenhagen auctions - 'hammer prices' - are exhibited 
as an index in Figure 3 and relates to the same period as the price estimates in Figure 2. 
Also, the HP-trend is included and now a somewhat different picture evolves as the 
hammer prices seem to decline somewhat during the later part of the period analysed. 
The graph is constructed as an index and says nothing about the absolute prices of the 
wines but the relative increase in the hammer prices in the first part of the whole-
sample period is similar to the development of the price estimates and then, from 1997, 
no further increases in the general development of the hammer prices are experienced. 
Again, the smoothing technique is applied to the missing observations and due to the 
rather fluctuating character of the hammer prices the resulting dotted parts of the price 
curve must be interpreted with care. Alternatively, the data set can be exhibited in 
‘auction time’, i.e. the auctions entering the analysis are considered as a continuous set 
of observations – which is reported in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Indices of price estimates and hammer prices according to the 48 
auctions, 1988-2002 (Indices, 1988=100). 
 
PRICE ESTIMATE HAMMER PRICE 











Note: The data represent the 48 auctions taking place from the first quarter of 1988 to the second quarter 
of 2002, with one auction deleted due to missing observations as only few items of the selected 11 
Bordeaux wines appear at the specific auction. 
 
In Figure 4 the data are presented in 'auction time' representing the 48 specific auctions 
from which data are extracted, i.e. covering the same time period as in the former 
graphs. The conclusion is similar to the one obtained from the 'real time' graphs with a 
hammer price index following closely the estimated prices in the first part of the sample 
period and thereafter prices are stagnating or declining. 
 
The interpretation of the price indices in Figures 2, 3 and 4 must be done 
with caution as the graphs reveal nothing about the absolute level of wine  
prices, e.g. Figure 4 does not tell that the hammer prices are below the 
auctioneer’s evaluation. The hammer prices may well match the price 
estimations – or even bee above these – as the graphs are constructed as 
relative growth paths both linked to the index level 100 in 1988:Q1. To 
illustrate the problem the absolute prices of two of the wines are reported 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Selected auction prices for Mouton Rothschild and Haut Brion, 
Vintage 1982 (DKK per bottle). 
 
Vintage  1982:   Mouton  Rothschild    Haut  Brion 
   Price est.  Hammer price   Price est.  Hammer 
price 
 
June  2000   2100   2250    1500   1800 
November  1997  3000   2950    1800   1700 
September  1991  800   1000    650   1500 
March  1988   650   700    700   800 
Note: Prices listed in the Danish currency and referring to the price per bottle. 
 
The data in Table 1 is very selective and certainly not representative of all data used 
when constructing the former graphs, but it reveals the fact that if wines already in the 
first part of the sample period are sold at high hammer prices then the price 
development tends to be modest later on – which is one interpretation consistent with 
the price graphs.  
 
 
4. Business cycle indicators and the icon wine prices – empirical tests 
of co-movements 
 
In order to address the question of whether the auction wine prices are influenced by 
business cycle factors or not, five different indicators – either leading or coincident to 
the cycle – have been selected for the analysis. These indicators or macroeconomic 
variables, e.g. GDP, are listed in Table 2 where the correlation with the price estimates 
and the hammer prices also are to be found. 
 
Table 2. Correlation between wine auction prices and business cycle 
indicators. 
 
Price estimate      Hammer price 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- 
Consumer  confidence   0.343       0.661 
Industrial  activity   0.004     -0.009 
Car  sales    0.251       0.557 
Stock  Market  Index   0.929       0.591 
GDP     0.949       0.829 
Private  consumption   0.922       0.882 
  
Note: GDP and private consumption seasonally adjusted and measured in nominal prices - like the 
indices of wine prices. The 'price estimate' is from the published auction sales material as announced in 
due time before the auctions take place.  
Data sources: Statistics Denmark and the Copenhagen wine auctions. 
 
The first two indicators represent the confidence of the consumers concerning the short-
run future of the economy and similarly an index measuring the current business 
conditions are constructed for the industrial sector (in both cases by Statistics 
Denmark). Car sales are the monthly sales of new cars to consumers and the Stock 
Market Index is from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Finally, GDP and total private 
consumption are from the quarterly Danish National Accounts. 
 
The macroeconomic variables GDP and consumption are highly correlated with the 
auction prices but this is due to strong trends in all variables (except hammer prices 
from 1997) and a closer examination of short-run fluctuations reveals no obvious co-
movements. The same conclusion is covering the industrial activity indicator and the 
sales of new cars which is evident from the low correlation coefficients in Table 2. In 
contrast to this, the Stock Market Index seems to move in accordance with the wine 
price estimates as revealed by Figure 5. In fact, changes in stock market prices are 
expected to affect the auction prices on icon wines for several reasons. First of all, 
increasing stock prices affect the wealth of consumers positively. Most likely the 
majority of consumers/collectors demanding expensive wines have a portfolio that 
potentially is affected by stock prices changes. Secondly, if the prices of one particular 
asset (e.g. stocks) rise, part of the substitution effect is assumed to be at work and a part 
of the increased demand will be for other assets, e.g. paintings and fine and rare wines, 
see Jones and Storchmann (2001). 
  
Figure 5. Indices of wine price estimates and the Copenhagen Stock Market, 1988-
2002  (Wine price index, 1988=100). 
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Note: The Stock Market Index is 1983=100 and these data only cover the period 1989-2002. 
 
Especially in the later half of the time period analysed the two variables in Figure 5 
seem to behave in a similar pattern with a strong co-movement. This may be due to a 
coincidence, but from an economic point of view the wines may be perceived as an 
investment good, cf. the discussion in the introduction. Hence, the prices of icon wines 
should mimic the development of investment substitutes – at least in the long run. For 
the hammer prices the closest correlate seems to be the consumer confidence indicator 
which is included in Figure 6.  
  
Figure 6. Indices of hammer prices and the consumer confidence indicator, 1988-
2002 (Hammer price index, 1988=100). 
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Note: The consumer confidence indicator as published by Statistics Denmark, 2002. The indicator has 
been multiplied by a factor of ten in order to facilitate comparison with the hammer price in the graph.   
 
 
The consumer confidence indicator may take on negative and positive values according 
to the consumers’ feelings about the economic conditions they face. This indicator has 
been increasing from the late 1980s to 1995 and then it showed up with a slight decline 
somewhat similar to the hammer prices. The short-run fluctuations in the variables from 
Figure 6 do not seem to be very similar and the hypothesis that the consumer 
confidence has any influence on the hammer prices appears less convincing in 
comparison with the former assumption concerning the Stock Market influencing wine 
price evaluations. This is in accordance with the expected influence because the 
consumer confidence indicator is a broad measure of the expectations of all consumers, 
i.e. not only the most wealthy part of the consumer group, that must be assumed to 
dominate the demand for expensive wines. Therefore, consumer confidence indicators 
are expected to affect the demand for icon wines only when the up and down turns can 
be considered as persistent and with a certain time lag.   
 
For the purpose of further investigations of eventual short-run co-movements of the 
variables, the deviations from the HP-trends of all the respective variables are analysed 
with the following procedure employed. For each variable the HP-trend is calculated, 
e.g. as already illustrated in Figure 2 for the price estimates, and the residuals between 
the actual values of the variables and the HP-trends are for the respective cases depicted 
in Figures 7 and 8.  
  
Figure 7. Deviations between the HP-trends and the wine price estimates and the 
stock market index, 1988-2002. 
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Note: For both the price estimates and the Copenhagen Stock Market the HP-trend has been calculated 
and the difference between the respective variables and these trends are exhibited in the graph. When 
calculating the HP-trend, a smoothing weight of 1600 has been applied. 
 
 
The short-run fluctuations in Figure 7 are of a surprisingly similar character since the 
mid-1990s and hence a hypothesis of an influence from the stock market prices to the 
icon wines may be of some relevance and does not seem to be rejected by the data. As 
noted this argument is also discussed in Jones and Storchmann (2001) in relation to 
economic depression and the Asian stock market crisis in the 1990s influencing the 
Bordeaux wine prices. 
  
Figure 8. Deviations between the HP-trends and the hammer price index and the 
consumer confidence indicator, 1988-2002. 
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Note: For both the hammer prices and the consumer confidence indicator the HP-trend has been 
calculated and the difference between the respective variables and these trends are exhibited in the graph. 
When calculating the HP-trend, a smoothing weight of 1600 has been applied. 
 
 
A similar methodology is applied for the relationship between hammer prices and the 
consumer confidence indicator in Figure 8. In this case, no obvious relationship 
between the respective short-run fluctuations seems present - except when lags are 
introduced in the sense that lagged values of the consumer confidence indicator 
influence the present hammer prices, which supports the arguments above, that a 
present peak in the consumer confidence will show up as a positive hammer price effect 
at the upcoming wine auction, which may be some months ahead in time and thus 
causing the lag effect. Apart from this argument, the preliminary conclusion is not in 
favour of a link from consumer confidence to wine auction prices.  
 
 
5. Causality tests 
 
In connection with the graphical analysis of coincidence between the wine prices and 
business cycle indicators, Granger causality tests must be performed, e.g. as whether the 
stock market price index and the consumer confidence indicator significantly influence 
icon wine prices. For both cases, i.e. the stock market index and the consumer 
confidence indicator influencing the wine price estimates and the hammer prices, 
respectively, bivariate Granger tests are done by the following set of regressions:  
44
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WP: Wine price estimate 
SM: Stock market index 
 
 
An F-test is used to ascertain whether lags of the stock market index significantly help 
to explain the estimated wine price variable on the left-hand side of (2). If this is the 
case - and the opposite regression, reversing the variables in (2), reveals that wine 
prices do not impact on the stock market index (which is obvious) - a hypothesis of 
Granger-causality from stock market prices to wine prices  cannot be excluded. A 
similar set of tests are performed for hammer prices and the consumer confidence 
indicator, where obviously wine prices should have no influence on consumer 
confidence. In both cases the test is done for both level values and first difference 
values of the respective variables, and only the data representing 'auction time' from 
Figure 4 are included in the analysis in order to avoid performing tests with estimated 
data observations, cf. the smoothing applied to the monthly data in section 3. 
 
Table 3. Granger causality tests. 
 
    Level  variables   First  difference 
variables 
 
WP  ->  SM   1.06  (0.39)     0.98  (0.43)   
SM  ->  WP   2.48*  (0.06)     3.20*  (0.03) 
 
HP  ->  CC   1.17  (0.34)     1.04  (0.40) 
CC  ->  HP   3.71*  (0.01)     1.48  (0.23) 
 
Notes: WP: wine price estimates; SM: stock market index; HP: hammer prices; CC: consumer confidence 
indicator. 
The number of lags included in the tests is four in all cases and in parentheses the p-values are reported. 
First differences are directly calculated and therefore not of the log-form (also, the consumer confidence 
indicator may have a negative sign). A * indicates the lagged values of the respective variables to be 
significant at least at the ten per cent level.  
 
 
The results from Table 3 are nicely in accordance with the former results from section 
four. Hypotheses of effects from the wine auction to the stock market or the consumer 
confidence indicator are in all cases rejected as the high p-values indicate no significant 
influence from these variables. The stock market index may cause the wine price 
estimates at the ten per cent level of significance as the former variable cannot be 
excluded from the wine equation. Similarly, for the level values of the respective 
variables, the consumer confidence indicator influences the hammer prices - but not 
when first difference variables enter the analysis. Especially the lagged values of the 
consumer confidence indicator show up with positive signs in the hammer price 
equation of (2) - where the first lag has a negative sign, but lags of order 2, 3 and 4 are  
all positive - and thus help to explain the similarity of the variables depicted in Figure 
6; although a short-run relationship (Figure 8) still must be rejected.   
 
Another relevant hypothesis to investigate for in the Granger sense of causality is the 
question whether the auctioneer's wine price estimates influence the hammer prices - or 
vice versa. Performing the test for these wine price variables reveals no causality at 
either the five per cent or the ten per cent levels of significance when the number of 
lags included is four as in the former tests - although at just the ten per cent level the 
hypothesis of hammer price influencing the price estimates cannot be rejected when 
level values of the variables are used. When expanding the number of lags to six in the 
test procedure, the latter result is still present at least at the ten per cent level of 
significance, and hence causality between the auction wine prices is most likely to be 
from the hammer prices to the price evaluations - and not vice versa. This result is in 
accordance with the functioning of auctions. The auctioneer estimates prices for the 
auctions coming up based on inter alia earlier hammer prices. But once the auction has 
started, it is demand and supply conditions that determine prices. Principally, this is 
how smaller auctions work. On large auctions attracting many buyers and sellers with 
full information, the hammer prices are expected to be quite close to the estimated price 
in a more simultaneous way.





Economic factors are expected to affect the demand for goods and in particular the 
demand for luxury goods - and Cru Classé wines from Bordeaux certainly must be 
considered as belonging to the latter category. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the 
importance of the economic conditions for the prices of Cru Classé at wine auctions in 
Denmark. Using price data for eleven Bordeaux 'icon wines' obtained at the 
Copenhagen Wine Auctions (Bruun Rasmussen) over the period 1988-2002, the trend 
and business cycle influences are analysed by using various business cycle indicators 
for the Danish economy. Estimated wine prices as announced by the auctioneer are 
shown to be rather closely correlated with the overall Danish stock market index. 
However, stock market prices which are normally considered as a leading business 
cycle indicator do not seem to affect the hammer prices at the auctions significantly. 
Instead the hammer prices are more likely to be affected by the Danish consumer 
confidence indicator which is based on a monthly survey among consumers and 
represents the general consumer’s opinion about the short-run future of the economic 
conditions. More precisely, the hammer prices depend on the consumer confidence only 
after consumer confidence has actually changed, and the analyses suggest that there is a 
short time lag before changing consumer confidence can be traced in the auction prices. 
This result is in accordance with the apriori expectations concerning the wine market 
and its agents, i.e. consumers who can afford to buy Cru Classé wines do most likely 
not belong to that part of the economy where agents are forced to adjust their 
consumption pattern in accordance with the actual business conditions.   
 
                                                 
5 Emphasising this argument, Figure 2 shows that (except for the outlayers in the beginning and the end of 
the period illustrated) hammer prices at Copenhagen Actions (Bruun Rasmussen) fluctuate more from one 
period to the next than is the case for  the hammer prices at auctions of The Chicago Wine Company, 
which is a much larger auction.   
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